Since the crisis of August 1998 it has been generally accepted that the Russian reform strategy over preceding six years was faulty. The reasons for the failure of the Russian transition to a market economy, relative to achievements in Eastern Europe, have been clarified by a variety of new theoretical, empirical and comparative studies. This paper attempts an additional contribution by comparing the transition with economic decontrol in Britain following world wars. In the three cases the governments were confronted by similar challenges of shifting from a centrally controlled economic system, with negligible or attenuated private property rights, that was focussed on military production, to a market-oriented peacetime economy. But the transition policies adopted and the results obtained varied considerably. Although it is not possible to make universal conclusions concerning the relative merits of abrupt and gradual decontrol from the study of three historical cases, the rapid transitions in Britain after World War I and Russia in the 1990s were associated with numerous problems in reallocation of resources and restructuring. In contrast, the successful transition of the British economy in the post-World War II period was based on continued government intervention and control. This case indicates that the state can provide useful interim guidance in the reallocation process of the initial phase of transition, which is dominated by 'noise' and disorganisation. State-directed conversion programmes were, on the whole, effective in directing resources to pay Britain's foreign debts, maintaining full employment, and providing a social support system that improved the well-being of the population. The findings of this study suggest that a gradualist transition would have produced more sustainable institutional change and superior economic performance in Russia than did the neoliberal programme of abrupt change.
1.

Introduction
Throughout the period 1992-98 governments under President Yeltsin attempted to transform the Russian economic system. They pursued a neoliberal strategy that entailed rapid liberalization of prices and markets, macroeconomic stabilization, and mass privatization. Although some aspects of economic performance had improved by late 1997, severe economic problems developed thereafter, culminating in the crash of August 1998. This was triggered by falling oil prices and by the Asian economic collapse, but policy errors and neglect of flaws in the economic system underlay the crisis.
Since then it has been generally accepted that the Russian reform strategy was faulty. The attempted transition to a market economy in Russia in the 1990s produced a hybrid, malfunctioning economic system.
The reasons for the failure of the Russian transition have been clarified by new theoretical, empirical and comparative studies. This paper attempts an additional contribution to the analysis of the Russian economic experience by comparing the transition in the 1990s with economic decontrol in Britain following world wars. In the three cases the governments were confronted by similar challenges of shifting the economic system from a centrally controlled one, with negligible or attenuated private property rights, that was focussed on military production to a market-oriented peacetime economy.
1 But the transition policies adopted and the results obtained varied considerably.
The paper begins by reviewing concepts of relevance to the three transition case studies.
Section 3 examines the sudden decontrol of the British war economy after World War I. This is followed by a review of the gradual decontrol of the British war economy after World War II.
Section 5 analyzes developments in the Russian economy in the 1990s. Finally, some general conclusions are presented concerning the process of economic decontrol and transition.
Economic performance is determined by the features of an economic system, economic policies (such as fiscal, monetary, exchange rate), and the economic environment (for example., wars, oil prices). Performance measures include economic growth, price and output stability, static and dynamic efficiency, living standards, income distribution, and attainment of development objectives. Ideally, an economy would achieve economic growth with price and output stability, while raising living standards and maintaining inequality within acceptable limits. Chronic failure to achieve performance objectives can undermine the viability of an economic system and can contribute to revolutions (as in Russia in 1917 and in the USSR in 1991).
The present study considers four economic systems in the U.K., the U.S.S.R. and Russia in peace and war. Their main features are shown in Table 2 . The Soviet peacetime command economy relied on central direction, non-price control mechanisms (e.g. planning and rationing), state ownership of productive assets, and a mixture of incentives (state-determined material, ideological, coercive) intended to make managers as agents act in the interest of their principal, the state. 2 Its priority system accorded the highest ranking, and best conditions, to heavy industry and defence (Davis 1990, Forthcoming) . The essential processes of this system are described by the shortage economy model (Davis and Charemza 1989, Kornai 1992) .
The British peacetime capitalist economy before and after World War I was a prototype of the open, liberal market economy (column 2). Decision-making was decentralised, transactions were governed by prices determined in free markets, most property was privately owned, and incentives were material and provided primarily by markets. Corporate governance was beginning to be based on equity markets. Although, the British economic system deviated from the liberal model following
World War II because of the substantial state intervention, for the purposes of this paper it can be roughly described by column 2.
The characteristics of the contemporary Russian transition economic system are outlined in column 4 and described in greater detail in Table 13 .7 in Davis (1999a) . Decision making is more decentralised than in the Soviet system, but powerful central organs intervene in economic processes frequently but unpredictably. In principle, transactions are determined by markets and prices, but in reality state intervention and quantity controls play dominant roles. Most assets have been privatised, but in industry they have been sold to "insiders" and legal protection of property rights is weak.
Incentives are based on material rewards, but often these are not related to productive economic activities. Corporate governance is largely ineffective because of weakness of the state, banks and equity markets.
In wartime any basic economic system can be mobilised to support the military effort. If this mobilization proceeds beyond a critical point, a transition is made to a war economy. This type of economic system inevitably has many of the features of the command economy, although the degree of administrative intervention has varied between countries (Harrison 1988 (Harrison , 1996 . The British war economies during both World War I and World War II (column 3) were closer in many respects to Gregory and Stuart (1995), pg. 27, and Davis (1999a) Feature the Soviet command economy than to the U.S. market-oriented war economy in that they relied on pervasive rationing, de facto nationalisation, and non-price control mechanisms.
Reduction in the degree of state intervention in an economic system is economic decontrol (Tawney 1943) . Its measures include privatisation, elimination of administrative oversight, liberalization of prices and foreign trade, and relaxation of exchange controls. Pursued far enough, decontrol can alter the nature of an economic system, initiating an economic transition.
The transition process involves the movement of an economic system from an initial state along a path to an end state associated with a different economic system. For most of the 20 th century economic transition referred to the shifts of "modes of production" from feudalism to capitalism to socialism to communism. Systemic transformations were represented as the result of clashes between classes (e.g. capitalists, proletariat) with the ascendant class usually being led by a revolutionary group (Bolsheviks for instance). In the 1990s, economic transition usually describes the change from a centralized, state-owned, planned economy to a market economy that is predominantly privately owned, decentralized and governed by market mechanisms.
A transition strategy determines the path from the initial state to the desired end state and the speed of movement. It involves the choice of reforms to develop or create institutions, as well as of economic programmes (e.g. privatization) and policies (e.g. macroeconomic stabilization) to facilitate movement toward established objectives. In the early post-Communist transition the principal strategic options were "big bang" and "gradualism" (Roland 1994 , Sachs 1994 , Gros and Steinherr 1995 , Blanchard 1997 . Within a given strategy there is scope for variations in policies, such as orthodox versus heterodox stabilization. Strategic and policy errors (such as maintaining an over-valued exchange rate) can adversely affect the outcomes of the transition.
Both command and war economies allocate resources administratively in accordance with the preferences of the political elite. They distribute significantly more capital and labour to heavy and defence industries than would an open market economy in peacetime. In the centrally planned economies the over-developed branches of industry typically had low productivity and their products were uncompetitive in world markets. In consequence, one of the main tasks of transition from a command/war economy to a market one is the reallocation of resources within manufacturing to competitive sectors and from industry to services.
The reallocation is described in simple form in Diagram 1 (Blanchard 1997). The equilibrium position pre-transition is denoted by point A. The demand for labour by state firms, SS, is measured from left to right on the horizontal axis, whereas private sector demand, PP, is measured right to left.
The equilibrium real wage is w and full employment is achieved at A. Assume that transition policies initially involve a removal of subsidies to the state sector but no significant change for the private sector. For example, the private sector goes on paying taxes because the debt incurred to pay for the war must be serviced and redeemed, whereas the "100 per cent subsidies", the purchase of armaments and war-related stores by the government ceases. The state sector demand curve for labour will shift to the left (SS') and the demand for labour at the existing wage, w, will drop to B.
Private sector employment, N p, will continue to be that associated with point A. In this case, unemployment will increase to U. Over the longer term, in an optimistic case, surviving state firms will restructure and the real wage will decline to w. State and private demands for labour approach point C and unemployment falls from the early phase of transition peak. This would be a positive benefit from the process of "creative destruction" in the economy.
This reallocation problem suggests that former war/command economies undergoing decontrol could exhibit similar "double cycles" without state intervention (cf. Pigou 1948) . After the forced participation of labour in the war/command economy, decontrol allows some workers to leave the workforce and others to work less hard or put in shorter hours (again, a decline in state employment in Diagram 1). Physical output therefore should fall, although that may not be true of the market value of output, other things being equal. This slump will be reinforced by the cancellation of government orders (the process already discussed). A contrary tendency should soon come into play as a result of reconstruction, however. In both market and planned economies after a war there is worn out or destroyed physical equipment to be replaced or repaired and there are many (Rapaczynski 1996) . The four million men demobilised in Britain at the end of World War I to join a male workforce of eight million often experienced this acutely, albeit in less extreme form than former Soviet workers. One returning former army officer (Graves 1979, pg. 254) wrote that, after nearly five years on active service:
I still had the army habit of commandeering anything of uncertain ownership that I found lying about; also a difficulty in telling the truth -it was always easier for me now, when charged with any fault, to lie my way out in army style.
During transitions in the aftermath of wars or in Eastern Europe/FSU in the 1990s, reallocation and restructuring are impeded by "noise" that distorts price signals and "disorganization". The latter is caused by the break-down in traditional links between industrial firms and their suppliers, both within the country and abroad (Blanchard and Kremer 1998). It takes time for markets to develop and for price signals to direct resources. This confusion, and the adverse impacts on output and efficiency, is connected with "transformational recession", which is engendered by the shift in economic systems from a resource-constrained (shortage) economy to a demand-constrained (market) economy (Kornai 1994).
Disorganization in a transition process creates bottlenecks due to deficiencies in infrastructure and/or insufficient production of key goods and services. During the debate over the industrialization strategy in the U.S.S.R. in the 1920s, those who believed in gradualism and genetic planning argued that bottlenecks should be avoided by ensuring the economy developed toward socialism in a balanced and flexible manner. Advocates of teleological planning, however, claimed that attainment of Party-determined goals was of over-riding importance and that bottlenecks should be "broken through" when they are engendered by rapid unbalanced development. Similar debates have arisen in the 1990s. Economists in favour of gradualist (genetic) transition urged caution in the face of bottlenecks. In contrast, the advocates of the "big bang" strategy favoured attacking them simultaneously on all fronts.
Throughout the 20 th century there have been debates over whether transition from one economic system to another is best advanced by the "ideological, fundamental and root-and-branch approach to reform as opposed to an incremental, remedial, piecemeal and adaptive approach" (Stiglitz 1999, pg. 22 (Murrell 1995 , Wedel 1998 , Stiglitz 1999 . According to this doctrine, transition could be most effectively advanced on the basis of a programme of rapidly introduced, comprehensive reforms that included: price liberalization; mass privatisation; macroeconomic stabilization using heterodox packages (e.g. using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor); foreign trade liberalization (e.g. elimination of the state monopoly of foreign trade and adoption of low explicit tariffs); and currency convertibility (Sachs 1994 , World Bank 1996 . The neoliberals considered that governments in the transition countries were inefficient, obstructive and corrupt. Economic processes therefore should be governed by markets and free prices in the private sector. The IMF, World Bank and EBRD consistently argued that a rigorously implemented liberal strategy would achieve the best economic results.
Many area specialist economists criticized neoliberal doctrines concerning the transition strategy and policies. 3 Subsequent theoretical and empirical work undermined many of the arguments of the neoliberals and demonstrated that failures in programmes of macroeconomic stabilization and voucher mass privatisation were due primarily to design flaws rather than to improper implementation. The critique of the Washington Consensus by Stiglitz (1999) provides a comprehensive review of the main points. He claims that the liberal reformers misunderstood the essential nature of the existing market economies and based their policy prescriptions on simplistic neoclassical economic models. They placed great faith in private property, markets and prices but ignored many key features of capitalist economies that ensure their effective functioning. Among the deficiencies of relevance to this paper are: general neglect of institutions and particular inattention to social and organisational capital and to legal infrastructure; failure to recognize that the price system is not the only conveyor of information; naive belief in the efficacy of privatisation on its own; misunderstanding of the investment process and the roles of financial institutions; and neglect of the contribution of the state to managing an economy.
By the mid-1990s it was evident that weaknesses of the states in many of the transition countries were undermining economic programmes. Macroeconomic stabilization was jeopardized by failures to collect taxes, industrial restructuring was hamstrung by inadequate legal safeguards of private property, competition policy was blocked by regulatory capture and development of adequate social safety nets was stillborn. A new, more centrist, orthodoxy was outlined in World Bank (1997), which acknowledged the constructive role of state institutions in market economies. Overall, the consensus concerning transition shifted from the liberal end of the economic policy spectrum toward the middle.
Abrupt Decontrol of the British War Economy after 1918
The transition from a war economy in Britain after 1918 was primarily governed by liberal economic policies and a "big bang" stabilization programme. Free markets and private enterprise were expected to direct economic activities almost immediately, despite the massive changes in the structure of the economy caused by the war effort and the fragile state of many market-related institutions. This abrupt decontrol of an administered economic system created problems in reallocation of resources and restructuring.
As World War I intensified, it had become clear that a comprehensive mobilization of resources was needed. Britain developed a war economy with the features summarized in Table 2 ( Dearle 1929; Tawney 1943; Ministry of Munitions 1918-22 were working in industries that were subjected to wartime regulation. For example, the Ministry of
Munitions employed directly and indirectly 3.4 million. The government transferred workers from "non-essential" to "essential" jobs and held them there by a system of leaving certificates. Wage rates were set within centrally-determined bands.
In retail markets more than four-fifths of all food consumed by civilians was bought and sold by the Ministry of Food and over nine-tenths was subject to maximum prices fixed by the Ministry (Beveridge 1928 , Lloyd 1924 . The wholesale market was carefully controlled and industrial supplies were allocated according to state priorities and administrative prices. Capital markets were highly restricted and the state directed the flow of investment into sectors of the economy that were vital for the war effort. Freedom of international trade was suspended. Ninety percent of imports were purchased on the Government's account and shipping was controlled (Fayle 1924) . The British economy's dependence on imported food and raw materials gave the state a powerful instrument of economic influence. Tight controls were placed on the convertibility of sterling and the exchange rate was managed in accordance with war aims. Private property rights in industry continued to exist, but they were radically attenuated. The Ministries of Food and Agriculture determined the utilization of land. The Railway Executive, the Ministry of Shipping, and the Canal Control Committee directed transport. Many private residences and commercial building were requisitioned for war uses.
National output and employment rose during the war while price stability was maintained by administrative means. Annual production of artillery pieces rose from 91 in 1914 to 8,039 in 1918, while aircraft production increased from 200 to 32,000 over the same period. Although government followed prudent macroeconomic policies, it was not possible to finance its cumulative (imperial) war expenditure, amounting to 40 per cent of the Allied total, with tax revenue and sale of assets (Kennedy 1988, pg. 274) . The British government was obliged to borrow heavily in world capital markets and to guarantee loans for financially weaker allies, such as Italy and Russia.
When the war ended the British government was confronted by a multitude of tasks. One was to transform the economic system, with the accompanying reallocation and restructuring (Diagram 1). Others included maintaining domestic political control in a revolutionary period, rebuilding international economic relations in a severely disrupted global economy, and servicing a massive war debt. Inevitably, alternative transition strategies were debated. Many members of the government and public had become accustomed to the wartime economy, with its extensive state intervention, and were in favour of gradual change to an economic system with greater government involvement than before the war. The War Cabinet received reports listing advantages of the war-time controls.
De jure state ownership of industry controlled by government, and already de facto nationalized, was a popular solution, especially for transportation, electricity and coal. Indeed, Winston Churchill advocated the nationalization of railways in his 1918 election campaign (Mowat 1955, pg. 16 ).
In contrast, influential representatives of business and banking were in favour of rapid decontrol and a reversion to the pre-war system. The 1919 Cunliffe Committee advocated a speedy return to normality in the economy and to the Gold Standard. Although advice from the U.S.A.
concerning post-war economic policies was not especially important in influencing the British debate on transition, it was based on liberal prescriptions (market-determined prices, free trade, promotion of competition) and therefore supported those in favour of rapid decontrol.
However, initial economic and social policies were primarily influenced by the government's determination to maintain political stability in a chaotic world. The revolutions in Russia had attracted considerable interest. For example, the leader of the Labour Party, Ramsay MacDonald, supported discussions about the formation of workers' and soldiers' councils in Great Britain. By the end of the war most armed forces were experiencing difficulty in maintaining discipline as unrest increased among the troops and occasional mutinies occurred. In January 1919 a "soldiers' council" was formed at the Army Service Corps depot at Kempton Park, and soldiers demonstrated near Whitehall demanding to be demobilised. Taking these factors into account, Churchill accelerated demobilisation. Within a year over 4 million men had been released (Pigou 1948 ). Lloyd George wrested control of the public finances from the Treasury, and ordered an expansion of demand in order to absorb the newly released labour (Howson 1975) . As a result, industrial output rose in the period 1919-20 and unemployment was kept low (Table 3 ). The social safety net was improved to ensure that the unemployed received relatively generous benefits. A reaction to the effort of war work was a spontaneous labour-led reduction of the length of the working week in industry, as well as withdrawal from the labour force of many workers, especially women (Broadberry 1990; Dowie 1975 ).
While this boom was occurring the debate over the transition strategy was resolved in favour of a "big bang", thanks merely to inertial forces. The legislation that had allowed the government to intervene comprehensively in the wartime economy also provided for the termination of special powers within a short period of the cessation of hostilities. Although arguments were put forward to maintain key aspects of the war economy, parliament did not pass supportive legislation. As a result, by 1920 most administrative controls affecting the markets and prices shown in Table 1 Mitchell (1962) and converted, respectively, from 1924=100 and 1914=100. Investment/GDP from Feinstein (1965) .
The peacetime economic system that emerged in Britain had many of the characteristics of the pre-war one, but the war had generated significant changes in both the domestic and world economy (Foreman-Peck 1995) . Much social and organisational capital had been degraded during the war, along with physical capital. The re-establishment of the conventions and customs on which markets depend required considerable time, especially without government involvement. There was substantial "noise" and "disorganisation" in the economy that impeded microeconomic adjustments in markets. This caused confusion even among those who had been the strongest advocates of rapid decontrol:
It was difficult for [businessmen] to realise, especially in a continent accustomed for nearly half a century to take an ordered routine of existence for granted, that the very possibility of economic activity depends on the maintenance of an elaborate framework of economic habits, social conventions, rules of law and political organization which is a highly artificial product, and with the crumbling of which, the operations of business are arrested or stultified. (Tawney 1943) Although most property was transferred back to the private sector rapidly, this was not sufficient in itself to ensure effective corporate governance and necessary restructuring.
Another key economic objective was to return to the gold standard. The exchange rate was allowed to float up at the end of the war (rather than adopting rigorous controls around a fixed rate as after World War II). This allowed British inflation during the post war boom and subsequently required extensive price deflation to return to the gold standard at the pre-war rate. Meanwhile confused signals about optimal movements of labour and capital were transmitted, exacerbating the unemployment problem described in the preceding section. A speculative stock-market boom overcapitalised a large number of companies and required subsequent painful restructuring.
While the economic system was adjusting to the rapid decontrol, macroeconomic policies abruptly changed. Once demobilization was completed in 1920, the Treasury regained its influence and attempted to combat the growing inflation by tightening fiscal and monetary policies. The demand-suppressing macroeconomic policies generated deflation and a fall in output (Table 3) .
Industrial production collapsed to its 1918 level in 1921, but increased in subsequent years. The combination of disorganization in the economic system together with unstable and incorrect economic policies (such as an over-valued exchange rate) undermined the reallocation of resources and restructuring of industry. Sectors that had over-expanded during the war in response to administrative signals (e.g. shipbuilding, engineering, coal and cotton) did not adjust to weak and confusing signals from markets. Keynes' former intellectual adversary Pigou (1948, pg. 4) , observed that "many persons for many years were clinging to occupations in which their services were not, and were not likely to be wanted…there was a role for a well managed state to signal the change in Sources: Britain 1918 -25 Pigou (1948 Britain 1945-52 LCES and Annual Abstract of Statistics; Russia 1991 -98 GKRFS (1998 ) and EBRD (1999 . the world pattern of industry". The consequences of these adjustment problems plagued the British economy throughout the inter-war period.
Gradual Decontrol of the British War Economy After 1945
In contrast to the transition after 1918, and in part because of the lessons learned from it, the transition after 1945 was much more gradual. The state maintained administrative controls for much of the initial post-war decade and its macroeconomic policies were more expansive. The outcomes of this shift from a war economy were more benign.
During 1939-45 Britain again developed an effective war economy in which all the features identified in Table 2 and the administrative controls listed in Table 1 were more pronounced than was the case in the First World War. 4 The armed forces and defence-related industries were given highest priority. Civilian investment and consumption were severely reduced. At the peak of the war, over two-thirds of national resources were directly employed on government work (Robinson 1951, pg. 35) . Wartime planning was based on physical output targets and rationing. As in the U.S.S.R., central planning was not infallible and plans never were fulfilled exactly because of second thoughts, errors or changes in circumstances. However, the administrative system did ensure the economy effectively attained vital targets 5 .
By 1944, 22 % of the British labour force was in the armed forces and another 33 % was in war-related employment. The manpower survey and manpower allocation provided the foundation for central planning in the later phases of the war. The Control of Engagement Order required employers to hire labour and workers to take jobs in accordance with instructions of the national employment service (Cairncross 1985) .
The retail market was heavily regulated. Food and clothing were rationed. At the end of the war, one-half of total consumer spending was on goods and services affected by price controls.
Virtually all producer goods that normally were traded in wholesale markets were either rationed by the state or traded in prescribed quantities at controlled prices.
Banks were tightly regulated and their main function was to mobilize resources for state directed investment. Domestic capital and equity markets became dormant. Sterling was made inconvertible for the private sector during the war. The government manipulated the exchange rate and used available foreign currency to achieve war objectives. Foreign trade by individuals was prohibited. The state governed the flows of resources into and out of the country on the basis of quantity-based import and export controls (Allen 1946 ).
The war economy of Britain differed radically from that of the U.S.A. The United States was under less pressure to mobilize resources and it did not rely significantly on nationalization and physical planning. The American economy, at least five times the size of the British, was more able to maintain markets in relatively free forms and relied on monetary controls (Robinson 1951, pg. 54 ).
The British war economic system achieved its main goals. The production of all major weapons system increased dramatically. Annual aircraft output rose from 7,940 in 1939 to a peak of By early 1945 it became clear that both Germany and Japan were heading for defeat and that planning for peacetime should be accelerated. The problems that would confront Britain during the transition in the reallocation of resources and industrial restructuring would be more acute than those following World War I because the economy had become more distorted by the higher intensity and longer duration of World War II. Furthermore, there was considerable international disorganization.
Continental Europe had been devastated by the conflict, as had large areas of Asia. There was a realignment of the global political system. The Soviet Union was expanding control into Europe and revolutionary communist movements were strong in major European countries, notably France and Italy, and in the Third World.
In the policy debate the right-left conflict was more acute than after 1918. The Conservative Party and liberal economists were critical of central planning and public ownership, which were associated with the Stalinist system, and argued for a rapid return to a market economy with predominantly private ownership and uncontrolled prices. The "big bang" approach to transition was supported by the influential U.S. government, which advised Britain to decontrol quickly, emphasize macroeconomic stabilization, and move rapidly to currency convertibility and a flexible exchange rate. This strategy was opposed by the Labour Party and by a wide section of British policy-making opinion. During the war, the civil service commissioned the study of decontrol after the First World War by Cambridge economics Professor A.C. Pigou (the 1948 published version is cited above).
R.H. Tawney at the London School of Economics at the same time undertook and published in 1943
his own similar assessment (see bibliography). The Labour Party's policy in favour of state ownership of key industries, controls on capital and foreign currency markets, state-directed investment, and a tax-financed, comprehensive social safety net was therefore not merely partisan. In the labour market the government acquired powers to direct labour shortly after the Economic Survey for 1947 was published and these were not formally abandoned until 1950.
However, it was loathe to use labour controls in practice and never succeeded in linking them with the manpower budget. The much-maligned post-war social contract (Barnett 1986; Eichengreen 1996) seems to have yielded labour harmony dividends in the short run. Industrial disputes in the nationalized coal industry were absent in the transition period, despite the decline in the labour force, in contrast to the free enterprise inter-war years and to the strike-prone 1950s. That the devaluation of 1949 was not followed by a rise in wages may be interpreted as further evidence of the effectiveness of Labour's labour and social safety net policies (notably the introduction of the National Health Service in 1948) in maintaining social cohesion during a disruptive reallocation of resources. Conversion of war industries into civilian ones capable of producing goods to satisfy peace-time demands, and absorption of demobilised servicemen, were not the only challenges confronting the economy. In addition the structure of industry and employment needed to be changed from the 1938 pattern in order to manufacture the extra exports that would pay for the foreign exchange costs of the war.
The government kept controls in retail markets, for most of the first decade, after the war that were designed to align consumption with administratively-determined supplies (as in Soviet consumption planning) (Cairncross 1985, pp. 305, 334) . One-third of consumer spending was on rationed products in 1948, but from 1949 the proportion was never more than one eighth. Despite the excess demand for consumer goods at the fixed prices, the black market appears to have been relatively unimportant in Britain after the war, presumably due to the population's ideological commitment (Cairncross 1985, pg. 351 Britain, like most European countries, maintained tight restrictions on financial markets during the transition period . Credit was rationed and the state attempted to influence the flow to projects deemed useful for economic recovery. Foreign direct investment did not play a significant role in the British economy immediately after the war.
As mentioned, Britain moved rapidly to sterling convertibility, which was inconsistent with a gradual transition. This liberal policy was maintained for five weeks in 1947, the period necessary to exhaust British dollar reserves (Cairncross 1985, Chap. 6; Pressnell 1986, pp. 366-67) . Controls were re-imposed after the failure of this premature experiment. However, the run on sterling traumatized
British policy makers and made them acutely sensitive about exchange rate policies for many years afterwards.
Quantitative import controls remained in place after the war. Immediately after the war many properties under the control of the government were returned to their private owners. However, the Labour government nationalized several important industries (coal, electricity, telecommunications, steel) . This state control enabled the government to carry out some reactive restructuring without labour unrest, as discussed above. But more radical, strategic restructuring was deferred because of political constraints.
As a result of the gradual systemic changes and expansionary macroeconomic policies linked to the Cold War rearmament, the British economy performed quite well in the initial years after World War II (Table 4 and Diagram 2). The government was able to demobilize a large army and reallocate resources quickly to meet immediate needs while increasing output, maintaining full employment, and keeping inflation under control. Over the seven years after World War II the U.K.
did not experience a major slump and high unemployment rates as it did in the aftermath of World War I, although prices were kept under tighter control in the earlier period (Table 3 and Diagram 2).
Since recessions damage confidence and generate "noise" that distorts entrepreneurial decisions, the stability that accompanied the gradual transition undoubtedly was beneficial. Nonetheless, government policy was not necessarily optimal. The manufacturing sector was expanded to a historically unprecedented size to gain foreign exchange earnings to pay Britain's foreign debts. As a consequence of the neglect of radical restructuring, the sector later had to be run down as German and Japanese competition recovered, and high productivity service trades were encouraged to grow in its place.
Economic Transition in Russia in the 1990s
The policies governing the transition from the Soviet system in the 1990s were analogous in many respects to those in Britain after 1918, but the economic systems were quite different and agents in the Russian economy lacked even the memory of a free market system. The consequences of abrupt decontrol therefore were more adverse. The Soviet command economy evolved out of the Stalinist system. Its main characteristics are summarized in Table 2 and discussed in detail in Davis (1999a) . One salient feature was highly centralized control of economic processes. All the markets and prices identified in Table 1 were either tightly regulated or inactive. There was some freedom in the labour market, but wage rates were determined centrally and mobility was constrained by inflexibility in the housing market. Retail markets existed, but prices tended to be set below market clearing level, so they were afflicted by chronic excess demand and shortages. Industrial supplies were distributed by centralized rationing; wholesale markets were of negligible significance. Banks operated in accordance with state instructions, interest rates were unimportant and no equity market existed. The currency was inconvertible, citizens could not hold foreign currency, and administratively-determined currency conversion coefficients were used to link world market prices to ruble prices. The government held a monopoly of foreign trade and used planning to govern exchanges. All productive assets were owned by the state. The government, as principal, made use of material and moral incentives, to control the behaviour of its managers (agents). Resources were allocated in accordance with the preference of the Communist Party elite. Their main objectives were to develop science and industry in order to promote growth and to support a powerful military. The Soviet economy was dominated by a large military-industrial complex that had highest priority and, at a minimum, absorbed about 16 % of G.D.P. in the mid-eighties (Davis 1990, Forthcoming) .
Although the Soviet command economy was successful in achieving a number of objectives (expansion of industry, attainment of superpower status, creation of a comprehensive social safety net), it was plagued by the problems characteristic of a shortage economy (Davis and Charemza 1989, Kornai 1992) . Of particular concern to the leadership were the deceleration of growth, the failure to shift to intensive growth, and the widening technological gaps between the U.S.S.R. and the West, especially in the military sphere. Among the key tasks of General Secretary Gorbachev in the perestroika period were to reallocate resources between sectors (as discussed in section 2), improve efficiency and restructure industrial firms. A major defence industry conversion programme was adopted and the defence budget was cut. Numerous enterprise reforms were introduced with the objectives of decentralizing decision-making and raising productivity. However, the failure to introduce complementary reforms meant that firms operated in an economic environment with weakening planning, malfunctioning markets, and absence of scarcity prices. By 1989 severe external and internal disequilibria had developed. Economic performance deteriorated at an accelerating pace and the politico-economic system entered a terminal crisis.
In the final years of the Soviet system it was recognized that it would be necessary to make a transition to an economy based on market signals with a large, if not dominant, private sector.
Mikhail Gorbachev and his advisors remained committed to a gradualist reform strategy due to concerns about imbalances, the likely slow responses of institutions to remedial policies, and political opposition. Alternative proposals in favour of abrupt decontrol of the deteriorating command economy were advanced by young neoliberals, led by Yegor Gaidar, who had been impressed by the 1990 Polish "shock therapy" programme that was achieving good results (Aslund 1995) .
When the U.S.S.R. disintegrated and Boris Yeltsin became undisputed leader of Russia, he asked Gaidar to design and manage a "big bang" transition to a market economy. The reformers were highly critical of the state bureaucracy. They were determined to minimize its roles and to rely primarily on markets, prices and decentralized decision-making. Labour markets were allowed to establish wage rates. Domestic trade in most goods and service was legalized and the majority of retail prices were freed. The creation of wholesale markets was encouraged and about 80 % of prices were decontrolled (but not energy prices). Banking reforms were accelerated and the foundation for an equity market was established. The ruble was made convertible for current account purposes and controls on capital flows were loosened. The exchange rate was floated and the reformers abolished the state monopoly of foreign trade. Trade was liberalized and tariffs were set at low levels. Small-scale privatisation of retail trade establishments was immediately authorized. In late 1992 the government initiated the programme of mass privatisation of medium and large enterprises on the basis of vouchers.
These systemic reforms were complemented by macroeconomic stabilization measures. The
Russian programme, unlike that in Poland, was not heterodox in that no incomes policy was adopted nor was the exchange rate fixed and used as a nominal anchor. Reliance was placed on the tight fiscal and monetary policies characteristic of an orthodox programme. The government drastically cut state budget expenditure on subsidies and on defence. Little attention was paid to the restructuring of the military-industrial complex. It was assumed that the nascent market forces would govern the necessary reallocation of resources.
The Russian "big bang" transition programme was strongly supported by leading Western governments, the major multinational institutions (IMF, World Bank, EBRD), and many prominent economists. Western aid programmes poured money into projects that supported neoliberal economic policies, especially privatisation and stabilization (Wedel 1998 ).
The initial macroeconomic stabilization programme proved unsustainable, in part due to flaws in its design and mistakes in implementation. In early transition there were weak connections between macroeconomic control instruments and microeconomic behaviour because of "state desertion" and the sluggishness in the development of vital institutions, such as the central bank and the tax service. Lower level actors in Russia ignored taxation and interest rates, while the government routinely violated its adopted budget expenditure laws.
In this period "noise" and "disorganization" increased markedly as consequences of the collapse of the old command system, the instability and distorted nature of prices, and the breakdown of trading links with traditional partners in former CMEA and other FSU countries. Much of the social and organisational capital that was necessary for a market economy either was destroyed or not developed (Stiglitz 1999) . Economic institutions operated primarily in accordance with inertia and non-price (quantity) signals. Old patterns of production and supply were maintained. In place of sales revenue, bank loans and budget allocations, firms made use of uncontrolled inter-enterprise credit and barter. In order to cope with the growing indebtedness of firms, the central bank loosened controls on credit in Summer 1992, which resulted in high rates of inflation over the following year (Table 5 ).
The Gaidar government was more successful in implementing its radical policy of mass privatization. During 1993-94 the Russian government and its economic advisors reported on the inexorable increase in the private share of industry in a manner similar to Gosplan officials boasting about increases in the production of cement. However, it turned out that the overwhelming majority of firms were privatized on an "insider" basis and no effective corporate governance mechanisms were established. Banks had emerged as powerful institutions that regularly intervened in political and economic processes. However, neither banks nor the fragile equity market channelled much investment into industry for restructuring. Prices remained distorted, necessary market infrastructure was missing, and the legal system proved unable to protect private property rights. Given these circumstances, the economic recession and political instability, a substantial share of privatized assets were stolen by "entrepreneurs" with links to the government and the proceeds were spirited abroad. The privatization scheme resulted in minimal reallocation of resources between sectors and restructuring of industry. Unemployment rose from a negligible rate in the Soviet period to 7.1 % in
1994.
A second major effort at macroeconomic stabilization was made in the period 1994-97.
Considerable progress was achieved in meeting economic targets that the reformers considered to be of prime importance. Inflation decelerated, real interest rates were positive, the exchange rate was stable, surpluses were being achieved in foreign trade, and the budget deficit was financed in a noninflationary manner using GKOs (treasury bills). The stock market grew robustly; the Moscow , 1992 -99 Sources: 1992 -98 from GKRFS (1998 and EBRD (1999) ; 1999 numbers are from EBRD (1999 ), Russian Economic Trends (1999 ,2000 and Russian press reports.
Years
However, numerous analysts in Russia and the West were consistently critical of the neoliberal transition strategy and specific policies, such as the illegal sequestering of budget funds to meet IMF deficit targets and the defence of an over-valued rigid exchange rate after late 1997. 9 In contrast to the neoliberal reformers, the critics tended to focus on developments in the real sectors of the economy (e.g. industry and agriculture) and their problems, such as continuing negative growth of production, the inadequacy of investment, rising unemployment, and the deterioration in the population's health (Table 5 and Diagram 2). In their view, there was substantial evidence of systemic failure in the Russian economy even in the golden years.
Another key problem in Russia identified by the critics was "state desertion". The weakness of the government impeded both efforts to reform institutions and to implement economic policies.
For example, the state proved incapable of collecting approved taxes, which led to arbitrary budget sequestrations, failure by the government to pay wages of its employees and bills for goods and services, and chronic budget deficits. The weakness of the state contributed to the arbitrariness and ineffectiveness of the legal system and the rampant corruption, which undermined property rights and the reliability of contracts.
In any event, a major economic crisis developed in Russia from Autumn 1997, triggered both by internal weaknesses and exogenous shocks. The equity market bubble burst first; the index dropping from the peak of 450 to 50 in August 1998. Over the same period the unwise investments and speculative activities of most major Russian banks increased their vulnerability to shocks. One duly struck in August as a result of the decision of the liberal Kiriyenko government to devalue the ruble ("widen the exchange rate corridor") and to renege on payment of the government's debt (the GKOs). The banking system became paralysed, the exchange rate crashed, and Russian banks refused to honour forward exchange contracts with Western banks (EBRD 1998 , Ellman and Scharrenborg 1998 , Sapir 1999 . Because this crisis was not expected by many of the experts in the West, particularly those in institutions like the IMF and EBRD, it stimulated re-evaluations of theoretical positions, actual economic processes, and policy recommendations related not only to the Russian economy but also to transition economies in general.
By 1999 it was generally accepted that the attempt to achieve a rapid transition in Russia on the basis of the neoliberal strategy not only contributed to an unprecedented record of poor economic performance, but also spawned a malfunctioning hybrid economic system. Several interpretations of the Russian system have been proposed. According to Davis (1999b) , it has evolved from the politico-economic system of shortage described in Kornai (1992) . His Figure 15 .1 shows the interrelationships between five blocks of phenomena: Communist political power; state domination (public ownership); bureaucratic coordination (planning); microeconomic behaviour (soft budget constraints); and shortage-related problems. The liberal reform policies destroyed certain elements of the old system, such as the power of the Communist Party, and created new ones, such as private property. However, the Russian economy entered a transformational recession and, unlike some countries in Eastern Europe, did not achieve sufficient systemic reform to emerge from it. Instead, Russia has been left with a politico-economic system headed by a weak and corrupt state, decentralization of power, mass privatization of lucrative assets with an ineffective legal system, and survival of "shortage economy" phenomena, such as bureaucratic control, non-price signals, soft budget constraints, shortages and barter.
A second interpretation is that Russia has a politico-economic system committed to sustaining economically unviable manufacturing branches of industry (Gaddy and Ickes 1998). 10 This is a "virtual economy" because it is based on illusions about important economic variables:
prices, sales, wages, taxes, and budgets. At its heart is a mechanism that enables the government to redistribute from value-adding resource-producing industry (e.g. Gasprom) to value-subtracting manufacturing. This redistribution process is inextricably tied in with others, including demonetization of transactions and corruption.
A third alternative interpretation with a historical resonance is that the politico-economic system in Russia has developed into industrial feudalism. Ericson (1999) argues that its features are:
a weak centre with strong local authorities; parcelization of sovereignty; personalized authority and discretion; no separation of public and private roles; absence of factor markets; highly regulated commodity markets; diffuse property and contract rights; and control over the primary capital asset (land) as the source of power and wealth.
Over the two years since the August 1998 crisis the transition strategy in Russia has evolved under Prime Ministers Primakov, Stepashin and Putin. The new consensus is that earlier liberal policies were seriously flawed and that more state intervention is required. According to Vladimir Putin (1999) , the liberal reforms attempted to "transplant to Russian soil abstract models and schemes derived from foreign textbooks". The main concepts governing future developments should be Patriotism, Belief in Russia's Greatness, Stateness, and Social Solidarity. President Putin claims that the development of a strong and effective state is a precondition for economic reform:
Russia will not soon become, if it ever becomes, a second copy of, say, the U.S. or England, where liberal values have deep historical traditions. Among us the state, its institutions and structures, have always played an exclusively important role in the life of the country and the people. A strong state is for Russians not an anomaly, not something that must be fought against, but on the contrary it is the source and guarantor of order, the initiator and main driving force of all change.
Efforts are to be made to strengthen control over both domestic and foreign economic processes. For example, in 2000 steps have been taken to enhance the tax-collection powers of the state and to restrict movements of capital abroad by Russian enterprises. Putin also has promised measures that will direct investment into key sectors of the economy, promote exports of manufactures and stamp out corruption. As a result of the government's actions, the recovery in the price of oil to $ 25 per barrel and the stimulating effect on domestic industry of the devaluation, industrial production rose by 11 % in 1999 and G.D.P. increased by 3.2 %, while inflation remained at a low rate of 37 %. These positive developments continued in the first half of 2000. However, evaluation of the causes of recent trends in the Russian economy and it prospects is outside the scope of this chapter.
Conclusions
The British war economies and the peacetime Soviet economy were more similar in important aspects than is usually recognised. Their transitions therefore can be usefully compared.
Both economic systems evolved in times of acute crisis to mobilize scarce resources for the achievement of military objectives. Combinations of ideology, coercion, planning and rationing were substituted for material incentives, prices and market mechanisms. Of course, the British war economies and the Soviet economic system remained different in fundamental respects. Even in wartime conditions Britain remained a democracy with a long tradition of private property and free market activity. In contrast the U.S.S.R. had a dictatorship, a supply-constrained (shortage) economy and a convention of pervasive state intervention. Nonetheless, the experiences of these economies demonstrate that central direction possesses substantial advantages over market systems when there is a single over-riding purpose of the system: the development a powerful military machine for total war.
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The British and Russian governments faced similar challenges in their transitions from war/command economies based on administrative controls and dominated by military-industrial complexes. They had to return to, or construct, economic systems relying on prices and markets, while carrying out substantial re-distributions of capital and labour between sectors and restructuring of state-owned or controlled enterprises.
In the initial stages of transition in all three cases there was considerable "noise" and "disorganization" in the economy. This may be attributed in part to the dependence of any economic system on social and organizational capital to function properly. A rapid transition destroys the capital essential to the war/command system without providing the replacement social assets necessary for the new market arrangements. There also were major disruptions in both domestic and foreign supply links. Prices were unable immediately to convey necessary market data, and time was required for institutions to develop the contracts that provided vital supplemental information.
"Big bang" strategies and policies achieved limited successes in transforming war/command economic systems into properly functioning, peacetime market economies and reallocating resources. Abrupt shifts in systems and policies in the U.K. in the 1920s and Russia in the 1990s disrupted co-ordination and contributed to economic difficulties. The imperfect market mechanisms of early transition were not able to reallocate resources efficiently or ensure that firms were restructured into competitive unit. As a result, unemployment rose to high levels (Diagram 2). The shortcomings of this strategy also contributed to malfunctions in the emerging economic systems, most notably in Russia in the 1990s. One difference between these two cases is that the Russian economy has not exhibited the "double cycle" discussed in section 2, primarily because it has yet to recover enough to complete the initial cycle.
A related finding is that governments should focus on developments in the real sphere of the economy, and not become overly sensitive to financial variables. In the post-World War II case the British government maintained controls over real domestic and foreign flows to good advantage. In contrast, the post-World War I British government relinquished such controls abruptly and oriented its policies to financial variables that were conveying imperfect information about economic processes in a chaotic transitional period. This lesson is supported by a review of the studies produced by Russian reformers and optimistic Western analysts during 1994-97 and actual developments in 1997-99.
These cases indicate that official U.S. advice tends to the liberal end of the economic policy spectrum, reflecting twentieth century American ideology and circumstances of the U.S. economy.
Following both World Wars the U.S. government advised the U.K. government to decontrol its economic system rapidly. After World War I a liberal strategy was adopted, with largely negative results. Special circumstances after World War II (the start of the Cold War in 1948) permitted the British government to ignore a similar set of policy recommendations. In the 1990s the United States not only advised Russians to adopt a rapid transition strategy based on liberal policies, but also tried to influence domestic decision-making by providing high-level economic consultants to the Russian government, by allocating large sums of foreign aid to individual liberal reformers and pro-market programmes (especially privatisation), and by encouraging multinational organisations, such as the IMF and EBRD, to reinforce its neoliberal programme. In retrospect, it is evident that U.S. advice was not wholly correct in any of the three cases.
It is not possible to make universal conclusions concerning the relative merits of abrupt and gradual decontrol and transition from the study of three historical cases. One can observe that the rapid transitions in Britain after World War I and Russia in the 1990s were associated with numerous problems in reallocation of resources and restructuring. In contrast, the successful transition of the British economy in the post-World War II period was based on continued government intervention and control. This case indicates that the state can provide useful interim guidance in the reallocation process in the initial phase of transition, which is dominated by "noise" and disorganisation. Statedirected conversion programmes were, on the whole, effective in directing resources into exports essential to pay Britain's foreign debts, maintaining full employment, and providing a social support system that improved the well-being of the population. The findings of this study and others cited suggest that a gradualist transition would have produced more sustainable institutional change and superior economic performance in Russia than did the neoliberal programme of abrupt change.
Endnotes
1 This paper is similar in spirit to the study by Feinstein (1990) . He analysed several historical cases of transitions from centralized economic systems. Among his main conclusions were: transition was likely to take an extended period of time; the state would play an important role in transition; an effective financial sector would be needed; and foreign direct investment would be influential in restructuring the economy.
2
See Table 136 in Davis (1999a) for a more detailed description of the Soviet command economic system.
3
Among the criticisms of the neoliberal transition strategy and its results in the mid-90s are Roland (1994) , Taylor (1994) , Murrell (1995 Murrell ( , 1996 , Ellman (1995) , Sapir (1996) , and Brada (1996) . 4 In Audit of War, Barnett (1986) condemns the war economy and transition in the light of the economic failures of the later 1960s and 1970s. This ignores the substantial achievement of the years immediately after 1945 in contrast to those after 1918.
5
Detailed histories of the British war economy are to be found in Hancock and Gowing (1952), Hurstfield (1953) , Scott and Hughes (1955) , Hall and Wrigley (1956) and Hornby (1956) 6
The "social safety net" that Sachs (1994) identifies as a key element of contemporary transition was prominent in the British transition after 1945.
7
The Economic Survey of 1947 contained the first and only attempt in an official British publication to explain what economic planning entailed. It discussed the need to match resources and requirements, either manpower or national income, but no explanation was offered of how a balance would be reached. Detailed investment targets had disappeared from the Economic Surveys by 1951.
8
Optimistic assessments of economic transition in Russia include Aslund (1995) , Granville (1995) and Layard and Parker (1996) . International organisations such as the IMF and EBRD also presented optimistic appraisals of the Russian economy. The EBRD Transition Report 1997, published in August, forecast GDP growth of 3.0 percent for Russia in 1998. 9 Critical studies of Russian economic developments included Goldman (1994), Nolan (1995) and Sapir (1996) .
10
The issue of negative value added in industries of the transition economies has been discussed throughout the nineties. It was assumed that this phenomena would disappear as transition progressed due to the hardening of budget constraints and restructuring of industry (Gaddy and Ickes 1998) . As with barter, though, this has not happened in Russia (Commander and Mummsen 1998).
